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STATE OF UTAH 
HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN, 
Trustee in Bankruptcy of 
the ESTATE OF WHEAT BROS. 
PAINTERS & DECORATORS, a 
partnership, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N. A., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11768 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to set aside alleged preferential trans-
fers of money under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 
claiming that defendant obtained money in violation of the 
Act from Wheat Bros. Painters & Decorators, a partnership, 
for which plaintiff is the trustee in bankruptcy. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried February 24, 1969, before the Hon-
orable Stewart M. Hanson, sitting without a jury, subse-
quent to which a judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant for the sum of $27,331.25, together 
with interest in the amount of $3,624.62, and costs. Defen-
dant's motion to amend the findings, conclusions and decree 
was denied on June 30, 1969. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court judgment, 
claiming that no preferential transfers were effected which 
could be voided or recovered by the trustee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wheat Bros., painters and decorators, was a partner-
ship consisting of James L. Wheat, John Wheat and Joseph 
Wheat (R. 47), which had been a customer of First Security 
Bank since about 1950 (R. 74). During the months preced-
ing the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the partnership 
maintained a checking account at the Sugarhouse Office of 
the Bank. The partnership also borrowed money from the 
Bank from time to time. 
On May 19, 1965, the Company signed a ninety day note 
in favor of the Bank for $5,000.00 (Exhibit P-14). On or 
about June 1, 1965, the Company submitted a financial state-
ment to the Bank which showed assets of $95,342.00 and 
liabilities of $16,000.00 (Exhibit D-15). On July 13, 1965, 
the Company signed a second ninety day note for $5,000.00 
(Exhibit P-14) 
From August 9th through September 21st, the Company 
had a continuous overdraft which became increasingly larger 
until at the close of business on September 21st the Company 
had an overdraft of $18,768.28 (Exhibit P-12). During the 
period of the overdraft, officers of the Bank visited the 
Company and also talked with the partners over the tele-
phone concerning the overdraft. The Company reassured 
the Bank that deposits would soon be forthcoming which 
would more than cover the overdraft (Exhibit D-18). On 
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September 10th the Company made a deposit of $3,986.70 
and on September 15th it made another deposit for $3,411.00 
(Exhibit P-12). 
After the close of business on September 21st, the Com-
pany made a deposit of $21,320.08 (Exhibit P-10). No con-
versations were held regarding the purpose or effect of that 
deposit (R. 81). The bulk of that deposit was a check from 
Jacobsen Construction Company for $18,150.00 (Exhibit 
P-11). The next morning, September 22nd, the Bank en-
dorsed the Jacobsen check for collection and sent it by mes-
senger over to Zions Bank where a cashier's check was 
obtained for the amount of the Jacobsen check (R. 82). 
Thereafter, the Wheat Bros. deposit was automatically set 
off against the overdraft giving Wheat Bros. a credit bal-
ance against which they drafted checks (R. 85-6). 
On September 24th a deposit was made by the Company 
for $997.56 and another deposit was made on September 
29th for $3,283.03 (Exhibit P-12). On or about September 
28th the Company submitted another financial statement to 
the Bank. Although this financial statement presented a dif-
ferent picture to the Bank than had been seen previously, 
the statement still showed assets of $68,800.00 and liabilities 
of only $38,800.00 (Exhibit D-19, R. 104-5). During the 
period of time from September 22nd to October 4th, the 
Company continued to draw checks against their credit bal-
ance with the Bank. 
On October 4, 1965, the Company made a deposit with 
the Bank of $7,384.00, with no prior conversations regarding 
the purpose of the deposit. Later on that same day, the Bank 
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set off $5,131.25 against the note that had fallen due on 
August 17, 1965 (R. 96). After that setoff, the Company 
again had a credit balance against which it drafted checks. 
Another deposit was made on October 8, 1965, of $3,696.38 
(Exhibit P-12). 
On October 14, 1965, John Wheat collapsed in the office 
of the Company and was taken to the hospital where he re-
mained for a period of one month (R. 53). The next day the 
Wheat Bros.' payroll was due and upon checking, Joe Wheat 
found insufficient funds in the bank account to pay the 
employees. Therefore, Joe collected enough accounts re-
ceivables to meet the payroll and on October 18th made a 
deposit of $4,153.48 to cover the payroll checks. The Bank 
officers did not know of the purpose of the deposit, nor was 
any arrangement made with respect thereto (R. 53-4). Later 
that day, the Bank made a setoff of $4,050.00 against the 
second note which had fallen due on October 11, 1965 (R. 
97). 
On October 19, 1965, Joe Wheat laid off all employees 
and shut the Company down except for some minor jobs 
which he finished himself. The next day, October 20th, Joe 
and Jim Wheat went to the Bank to talk with Mr. Bentley 
W. Vincent and Mr. Boyd A. Lindquist, the manager and 
assistant manager, respectively, of the Sugarhouse Office. 
Joe told Mr. Vincent that the Company had receivables of 
$18,000.00 and debts of over $70,000.00 (R. 57). 
On December 8, 1965, voluntary petitions in bankruptcy 
were filed by Wheat Bros. Painters & Decorators, a partner-
ship, and its three partners individually (Exhibit P-1 
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through P-4). The partnership schedules in bankruptcy 
show liabilities in the amount of $73,053.99 and assets in 
the amount of $17,127.00 (Exhibit P-1). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. THE DEPOSITS AND SETOFFS BETWEEN 
WHEAT BROS. AND THE BANK DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS UNDER SECTION 60 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 
The most pertinent parts of Section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act state: 
"Section 60. Preferred Creditors. 
a. (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this 
act, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the 
benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent 
debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent 
and within four months before the filing by or against 
him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this 
Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such 
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than 
some other creditor of the same class. 
* * * * * 
"b. Any such preference may be avoided by the 
trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited 
thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, 
at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable 
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." 
Plaintiff alleged and the lower court held that the 
deposits and setoffs were preferential transfers under Sec-
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tion 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Appellant strongly urges 
that such a holding is in error, and that this case clearly 
comes under Section 68 (a) of the Act which is set forth 
and discussed under Point B hereinafter. Therefore, de-
fendant asserts that the elements of a preferential transfer 
on which plaintiff relies are irrelevant in this case and 
ought not to be considered. 
As the Court is well aware, when a deposit is made 
with a bank a relationship of debtor and creditor is cre-
ated. Since the depositor owed the bank debts because of 
the overdraft and overdue notes, a condition of mutual 
debts was created between the Bank and the Bankrupt. 
That brings the fact situation under Section 68 (a) and 
not under Section 60. Had the bank not exercised its right 
of setoff, the referee in bankruptcy would have been re-
quired to set off the mutual debts. 
That Section 68 is the governing Section in this case 
is clear from a statement found in 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 
(14th Ed.) par. 60.15: 
"The basic problem, however, becomes infinitely 
more complex when the situation arises, as is often 
the case, where the bank is a creditor of depositor and 
the depositor is insolvent. Tested by the requirements 
of Section 60, deposits made in the ordinary course of 
business in such situations are not preferential trans-
fers. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, there is 
nothing in the Act which prevents an insolvent from 
conducting his business in the usual way, or prohibits 
banks from dealing with him on that basis. But a 
complication arises due to the fact that Section 68 of 
the Act permits a setoff in the case of Mutual Debits 
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and Credits, and the use of this privilege, which in 
reality effects a legal preference, by a creditor bank 
in connection with the deposit of insolvent debtor ob-
viously opens the way to an indirect accomplishment 
of results generally prohibited by Section 60. 
"In an effort to reconcile these provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act, and at the same time prevent abuse, 
the courts have long since evolved a workable set of 
principles .... Summarized briefly, it was well set-
tled, prior to the Act of 1938, that deposits made in 
the ordinary course of business generally upon an open 
account and subject to withdrawal by check, were not 
preferential transfers, even if made while the debtor 
was insolvent and the bank had knowledge or notice 
of the depositor's insolvency . ... 
"The doctrine that banks could under certain con-
ditions accept deposits of a known insolvent and yet 
subsequently exercise the privilege of setoff gave rise 
to criticism in some quarters. Consequently, when the 
Act of 1938 was in its preliminary stages, certain 
amendments to Section 68 were proposed which would 
have altered the recognized rules. The amendments 
were not adopted, however, when the bill was finally 
enacted into law. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
term 'transfer' under Section 60 now has a wider sig-
nificance than formerly, and notwithstanding also that 
Section 68 was extensively revised to strike down 
preferences, whether effected directly or by remote 
obscure devices, it is quite clear that there was no 
intention to alter the accepted law as to make deposits. 
"It has been suggested by one well known author-
ity that while the principles relating to bank deposits 
and bank setoffs are grounded in common-sense and 
practical business policy, they can hardly be reconciled 
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with the express terms of the Act. However, this may 
be, the principles here stated and analyzed more fully 
under Section 68 have the sanction of the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority and should still govern where 
applicable." (emphasis added) 
An annotation found at 85 ALR 369, 372 ( 1933) also 
states that the general rule is that a bank setoff is not a 
preference: 
"The general rule is that the deposit by an insol-
vent, in a bank to which he is indebted, though within 
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, 
is not a transfer of property amounting to a pref er-
ence within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, so as 
to preclude the bank's right of setoff accorded by the 
act, provided the deposit is in the usual course of busi-
ness, to the open or general account of the depositor, 
subject to check (as subsequently shown, this rule ap-
plies even though the bank knows at the time that the 
depositor is insolvent.)" 
In the case of Citizens' National Bank vs. Lineberger, 
45 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1930), the Court, after stating that 
an ordinary deposit is not a "transfer" within the meaning 
of the Bankruptcy Act, said: 
"A deposit in a bank is not a sale or parting with 
property, or its possession, as a payment, pledge, mort-
gage, gift, or security. It does not deplete the estate of 
the depositor, but results in substituting for currency, 
bank notes, checks, drafts, and other bankable items a 
corresponding credit with the bank, which may be 
checked against, and which provides the depositor with 
the medium of exchange in universal use in the transac-
tion of business. A deposit of funds differs from a 
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payment in the essential particular that it is withdraw-
able at the will of the depositor. Of course, a deposit 
may be made the cloak for some other transaction, such 
as payment or the giving of security; and in such case 
equity, which looks through form to substance, will 
treat the transaction according to its real nature. But 
if the deposit is in reality a deposit, made in good faith 
as such, subject to the withdrawal of the depositor, 
and not made as a cloak for a payment or other for-
bidden transaction, it is not a transfer within the 
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act and cannot be attacked 
as preferential, even though it may have been made 
when the depositor was insolvent, and even though the 
bank, by applying it as a setoff, may have obtained a 
greater percentage on a debt which it holds against 
its insolvent depositor than his other creditors can 
obtain." Lineberger at 527-28 
Appellant claims that the case of Hall vs. Rochester 
Trust Co., 9 F. Supp. 797 (D.C.N.H. 1935), correctly states 
the law as to when Section 68(a) is applicable as opposed 
to Section 60 : 
"It is true that if the deposits by the company had 
been made in the defendant bank for the purpose of 
creating a right of setoff or if there had been any col-
lusion between the bankrupt and the bank to enable 
the bank to receive a greater percentage of its debts 
than any other unsecured creditor, then the transaction 
might be held to create a preference under section 60a. 
But such is not the fact in the instant case. I find there 
was nothing unusual or out of the ordinary in the 
transaction between the parties. They continued doing 
business in the usual and ordinary way right up to the 
time of the common-law assignment. The deposits 
were not made for the purpose of giving the bank a 
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preference and the bank had no reasonable cause to 
believe that the Leavitt Company was insolvent to the 
extent that it would not continue to meet its obliga-
tions. 
"I hold that the bank was within its rights when 
it on November 4, 1932, charged the bankrupt's ac-
count with $3, 718.52, and that the case is governed by 
section 68a of the Bankruptcy Act and not by section 
60a as New York County Bank v. Massey, supra; In re 
Scherzer (D.C.) 130 F. 631; In re Myers (D.C.) 99 
F. 691; Toof v. City National Bank of Paducah (C.C. 
A.) 206 F. 250." Hall at 800. 
In the case on appeal, the Court should apply Section 
68 (a) and not Section 60. The record evidences absolutely 
no collusion between the Bank and the Company. The Bank 
clearly had a right to set off the deposits it received from 
the bankrupt, and such setoff is governed by Section 68 (a). 
POINT I. 
B. UNDER SECTION 68(a) OF THE BANKRUPT-
CY ACT, THE BANK HAD A RIGHT TO SETOFF THE 
DEPOSITS MADE BY WHEAT BROS. AGAINST THE 
DEBTS OWED BY WHEAT BROS. TO THE BANK. 
Section 68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that: 
a. In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits be-
tween the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the ac-
count shall be stated and one debt shall be set off 
against the other, and the value only shall be allowed 
or paid. 
The rule that a bank may set off deposits against debts 
owed to it by the depositor is clear and supported by the 
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great weight of authority. When Wheat Bros. made de-
posits on September 21, October 4 and on October 18, the 
Bank was within its rights to set these deposits off against 
the overdraft and notes that were owing to the bank. 
Collier, who is considered the foremost expert on bank-
ruptcy, states that: 
"The general rule may first be stated that where an 
insolvent debtor makes general deposits within four 
months of his bankruptcy, which deposits are accepted 
in good faith and in the regular course of business, the 
bank has a right to set off such deposits against an 
obligation owing to it by the debtor ... 
It is only where affairs have reached such a point that 
the bank accepts the deposits for the purpose of pay-
ment, or of giving itself a subsequent advantage over 
other creditors through its right of setoff, or for some 
other special purpose, that the deposit and the subse-
quent application of it amounts to a reasonable pref-
erence. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) par. 68.16. 
Another text states that the deposit is the key factor 
in the allowability of a setoff and not the setoff. 
The right of setoff existing under the Bankruptcy Act 
raises some peculiar questions of preference in the case 
of deposits in a bank which holds obligations of the 
depositor. It is the making of the deposit, and not the 
subsequent application of it by way of setoff to the 
debt of the bank, that constitutes the preference, if 
any, under the Bankruptcy Act. 
A deposit in the usual course of business in good faith 
to the open or general account of the depositor, subject 
to his check, does not result in a preferential transfer, 
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notwithstanding it may place the bank in position, in 
the event of the depositor's bankruptcy, to set off the 
deposit against his debt to the bank. The rule applies 
to a deposit made subject to the collection of the dif-
ferent items thereof if the intent at the time of the 
deposit was that checks against it would be honored 
when the items were collected. The principal reason 
which the courts have assigned for the rule is that 
when a deposit is made under the circumstances indi-
cated, there is no diminution of the depositor's estate, 
since he thereby receives an equivalent credit, which is 
immediately available to him. 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bank-
ruptcy Sec. 525 (1963). (emphasis added) 
That the deposits were made in the usual course of 
business will be discussed under Point II. 
There are many cases wherein the court has upheld 
a bank's right to a setoff under Section 68. Perhaps the 
most frequently cited case is the United States Supreme 
Court case of New York County National Bank vs. Massey, 
192 U.S. 138, 48 L.Ed. 380 (1904). In that case the Court 
specifically approved a setoff by the bank from a deposi-
tor's account, to pay part of an overdue note. The Court 
held that the setoff was not a voidable transfer, and that 
it was a permissible setoff under Section 68 of the Act. 
The following statements are of importance: 
"As we have seen, a deposit of money to one's 
credit in a bank does not operate to diminish the estate 
of the depositor, for when he parts with the money he 
creates at the same time, on the part of the bank, an 
obligation to pay the amount of the deposit as soon as 
the depositor may see fit to draw a check against it. 
It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge, 
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mortgage, gift, or security. It is true that it creates a 
debt, which, if the creditor may set it off under Section 
68, amounts to permitting a creditor of that class to 
obtain more from the bankrupt's estate than creditors 
who are not in the same situation, and do not hold any 
debts of the bankrupt subject to set-off. But this does 
not, in our opinion, operate to enlarge the scope of the 
statute defining preferences so as to prevent set-off 
in cases coming within the terms of Section 68a. 
* * * * * 
"It is true, as we have seen, that in a sense the 
bank is permitted to obtain a greater percentage of 
its claim against the bankrupt than other creditors of 
the same class, but this indirect result is not brought 
about by the transfer of property within the meaning 
of the law. There is nothing in the findings to show 
fraud or collusion between the bankrupt and the bank 
with a view to create a preferential transfer of the 
bankrupt's property to the bank, and in the absence 
of such showing we cannot regard the deposit as hav-
ing other effect than to create a debt to the bankrupt, 
and not a diminution of his estate." Massey at 147. 
We submit that the case at bar falls directly within 
the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court 
in the Massey case. A very similar holding is given by the 
Supreme Court in Studley vs. Boylston National Bank of 
Boston, 229 U.S. 523, 57 L. Ed. 1313 (1913), where the 
Court again specifically approved setoffs by a bank within 
four months before bankruptcy and declared them not to 
be voidable transfers. 
"For there is nothing in the statute which de-
prives a bank, with whom an insolvent is doing busi-
ness, of the rights of any other creditor taking money 
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without reasonable cause to believe that a preference 
will result from the payment. The Bankruptcy Act 
contemplates that by remaining in business and at 
work, an insolvent may become able to pay off his 
debts. It does not prevent him from continuing in 
trade, depositing money in bank, drawing checks and 
paying debts as they mature, either to his own bank or 
any other creditor." Studley at 526. 
The case of White vs. Pacific Southwest Trust & Sav-
ings Bank, (9 F.2d 650 (D.C.S.O. Cal. 1926), contains a 
rather extensive discussion on many factors of bankruptcy 
law in a case where disgruntled creditors were attempting 
to set aside a court approved agreement under which two 
banks were permitted to retain funds received by them 
from the setoff of the bankrupt's accounts, even though 
the banks had been parties to creditors' agreements during 
a period of insolvency. The Court did not require the banks 
to return the money, stating as law: 
"It must be conceded that it is clearly established 
by the authorities that, where deposits are made by a 
depositor in good faith in the regular course of busi-
ness, and not for the purpose of enabling the bank to 
secure a preference, the bank has a right to set off a 
deposit against a claim held by it against a depositor 
who subsequently becomes a bankrupt. Collier on 
Bankruptcy (13th Ed.) p. 1612; New York County Na-
tional Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 48 
L. Ed. 380. And the bank's right to set-off in such 
cases is not defeated because it has knowledge or notice 
of the insolvency of its depositor. In re Wright-Dana 
Hardware Co. (D.C.) 207 F. 636; New York County 
National Bank v. Massey, supra; Studley, etc., v. 
Boylston Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 33 S. Ct. 806, 57 L. Ed. 
1313." White at 658. 
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In another interesting case the Court sustained the 
validity of two setoffs by two banks who were approached 
by an admittedly insolvent customer, and one bank said it 
would follow the lead of the other in deciding whether to 
extend new credit. Instead, both banks set off against over-
due accounts the funds on deposit in the customer's check-
ing account. Because the testimony proved that the deposits 
had been made in the regular course of business and not 
fraudulently and collusively for the purpose of giving the 
bank an unlawful preference, there was no reason to hold 
the setoffs to be voidable preferences. No attempt had 
been made to build up the balances and no restrictions 
had been placed on the withdrawal thereof, according to 
the Court. Also of importance was the following: 
"It is firmly established that the act of a bank in 
taking over the deposit of a bankrupt and setting it off 
against his debt to the bank under Section 68 is not a 
transfer within the meaning of the other sections re-
f erred to, provided the deposits were made in good 
faith and not as a cloak for a payment or other for-
bidden transaction. 
"But if the deposit is in reality a deposit, made in 
good faith as such, subject to the withdrawal of the 
depositor, and not made as a cloak for a payment or 
other forbidden transaction it is not a transfer within 
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act and cannot be at-
tacked as preferential, even though it may have been 
made when the depositor was insolvent, and even 
though the bank, by applying it as a set-off, may have 
obtained a greater percentage on a debt which it holds 
against, its insolvent depositor than his other creditors 
can obtain See also Kane v. First National Bank, 5 
Cir., 56 F.2d 534, 85 A.L.R. 362; Cusick v. Second Na-
16 
tional Bank, 73 App. D.C. 16, 115 F.2d 150." Hughes 
vs. Machen 164 F.2d 983, 986-87 (4th Cir. 1947). 
In the case of Jandrew vs. Guaranty State Bank of 
Ovilla, Texas, 294 F. 530 (5th Cir. 1923), the Court allowed 
the debtor to pay off a note owed to the bank by a check 
drawn on its deposits at the bank. The Court reasoned that 
under Section 68 the trustee would be required to do after 
bankruptcy what the bank and the depositor had done be-
fore bankruptcy. 
"The bankruptcy Act itself would do what the 
parties voluntarily did, had they omitted to do it. What 
the payment of the check transferred to the bank was 
only what the bank would have obtained as against 
other creditors of the same class, upon the filing of the 
petition, through the obligation of the trustee to apply 
the deposit to the payment of the notes in stating the 
account between the bank and the bankrupt. The pay-
ment of the check could have no effect to give the bank 
a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors 
of its class, since it would receive through payment by 
check only what the Bankruptcy Act would give it, 
though no such payment had been made to it. As the 
payment of the check was not a preferential payment, 
but merely a voluntary accomplishment of an off set, 
which was provided for by the Bankruptcy Act in the 
absence of voluntary action, we see no reason for dis-
allowing the offset because the parties anticipated the 
action of the law even though the bankrupt was then 
insolvent within the knowledge of the bank." Jandrew 
at 531. 
In the case of Farmer's Bank of Clinton, Mo. v. Julian, 
383 F.2d. 314 (8th Cir. 1967), the bank set off a deposit 
of $9,733.88 against $16,000.00 owed the bank. The amount 
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set off was in a general checking account used in the or-
dinary course of business by the bankrupt. In allowing the 
setoff the Court said : 
"Section 68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 108 applies and allows a setoff to the Bank unless the 
account has been accepted or built up for the real pur-
pose of permitting the Bank to obtain a preference 
by way of setoff of the account. A bank account at the 
time of filing the petition in bankruptcy is a debt due 
to the bankrupt from the bank, and in the absence of 
fraud or collusion between the bank and the bankrupt, 
the bank may set the account off against any indebt-
edness owed by the bankrupt. 
"The issue is : Was the account of the bankrupt 
built up, with the understanding of the Bank, for the 
purpose of allowing the Bank to use it as an offset and 
thereby obtain a preference?" Julian at 324. 
In addressing itself to this issue the Court held that 
the referee was in error in concluding that the account 
had been built up so that a setoff could be made even though 
the account went from a balance of $34.84 to $11,197.14 
in four days. The Court noted that the account was an 
active one and that checks were paid between the deposits. 
The bankrupt had testified that he had made no effort 
to build up the account or to make deposits other than to 
cover checks and that the deposits were made in the usual 
course of business. The Court also said : 
"The Bank on the same day had already honored 
a number of checks totaling some $1,400.00. This evi-
dence clearly indicates that there was no collusive 
build-up of the bank account and that the Bank only 
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decided to make the setoff on the day the setoff was 
actually executed. The refusal of Commercial Credit 
to proceed with the long-term capital loan triggered 
the Bank's decision to avail itself of its setoff right. 
The pattern of deposits and withdrawals throughout 
the month is fairly uniform and is certainly in line 
with the normal business operation of the bankrupt. 
"The fact that checks were outstanding against 
the account at the time of setoff negatives any intent 
on Woody's part to build up the account for the pur-
pose of setoff, and there is absolutely no evidence of 
any collusive or pre-arranged plan of action between 
Woody and the Bank to build up this account." Julian 
at 325. 
Defendant submits that the Julian case is very much 
in point with the case on appeal. The Bank paid Wheat 
Bros. checks before each of the deposits in question. The 
account was an active one. There is no evidence of a col-
lusive build-up of the account so that the Bank could make 
a setoff; in fact, the Bank did not know deposits would be 
made until they were brought into the Bank. The deposits 
were made in the regular course of business to cover checks 
with no thought of a build-up. Furthermore, the Bank only 
decided to make the setoff on the day it was made with 
the exception of the overdraft which was automatically set 
off. In short, there is absolutely no evidence of any col-
lusive or prearranged plan between Wheat Bros. and the 
Bank. 
The Julian case and the numerous other cases cited by 
defendant conclusively show that the case on appeal falls 
under Section 68 (a) and not Section 60. Therefore, since 
19 
plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof in showing 
collusion or a pre-arrangement, the setoffs must be allowed 
to stand. 
POINT II. 
THE DEPOSITS MADE BY WHEAT BROS. WERE 
MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND IN THE REGULAR 
COURSE OF BUSINESS. 
The cases and other authorities that ref er to a bank's 
right of setoff under Section 68 (a) state in various lan-
guage that the deposit must be made in good faith; made 
in the regular or ordinary course of business ; made to de-
posi tor's open or general account; deposit subject to his 
check; made without fraud or collusion between depositor 
and bank; intended as a deposit and not as a payment to 
the bank, etc. See, e.g., Rector v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 
200 U. S. 420, 50 L. Ed. 533 (1906); Kane v. First Nat. 
Bank, 56 F. 2d 534 (5th Cir., 1932); and Hughes v. 
Machen, 164 F. 2d 983 (4th Cir., 1947). 
The appellant contends that the deposits were made in 
good faith by Wheat Bros. and in the regular course of 
business. There is absolutely no evidence whatever of any 
collusion or fraud between the Bank and Wheat Bros. to 
allow a preference. 
Although the Bank had been in contact with Wheat 
Bros. prior to the deposit of September 21, 1965, because 
of the overdraft, the deposit was still made in the regular 
course of business. The Company had been depositing its 
payments for work completed with the Bank since 1952. 
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The deposit was made in the same way the Company always 
made deposits with the Bank, and there was nothing said 
about the deposit at the time it was made. The Bank did 
not have prior notice of any of the deposits in question, 
nor did the Bank have any intent to prefer itself over any 
other creditors. The clearing of an overdraft is an auto-
matic process which required no decision on the part of 
the Bank. After the overdraft was cleared, Wheat Bros. 
was left with a credit balance against which it drafted 
checks. 
In the trial court the appellee sought to show that the 
deposit was not in the regular course of business because 
the Jacobsen check, which was part of the September 21st 
deposit, was given special handling. Such handling is irrele-
vant to this point. The law requires that the deposits be 
made in good faith and in the regular course of business. 
The law says nothing about the collecting of deposits. The 
decision to give the Jacobsen check special handling was 
made after the deposit because of the size of the check, and 
was not related to receipt of the deposit. 
In the case of Wilson v. Citizens' Trust Co., 233 F. 697 
(D.C.S.D. Geo. 1916), the Court had to answer the ques-
tion as to whether a bank, which was aware of the deposi-
tor's insolvency, could draw a check on the bankrupt's 
acoount to setoff the deposit against debts owed to the bank. 
In dealing with that question the Court held that it was 
the making of the deposit, and not the subsequent applica-
tion of the same by way of setoff to the debt of the bank, 
that constituted the preference, if any, under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 
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It is submitted by an appellant that the abuse the 
Bankruptcy Act is trying to guard against is agreements 
by banks and insolvent depositors whereby the insolvent 
depositor makes a deposit with the intent to give the bank 
a preference. There is no evidence of such intent shown 
here on the part of Wheat Bros. 
That the deposits of October 4th and October 18th 
were made in good faith and in the regular course of busi-
ness is also very clear. Between September 10th and Oc-
tober 18th, Wheat Bros. made eight separate deposits total-
ing $48,232.23. The Bank did not know in advance that 
any one of the deposits would be made, nor had the Bank 
made arrangements with the Company for any of the de-
posits to be made. Each of the deposits was made in good 
faith by the Company with the intent to draw checks 
against them, and, in fact, the Bank paid all Wheat Bros.' 
checks up until September 20th and thereafter the Bank 
paid all Wheat Bros.' checks drafted against a credit bal-
ance. 
Concerning the deposit of October 18th, Joe Wheat's 
testimony clearly shows that the deposit was made specifi-
cally with the intent of meeting a payroll. 
In the case of McGuigan v. Dime Bank Title & Trust 
Co., 47 F.2d. 760 (2nd Cir. 1931), the bank had set off 
$38,994.09 against debts that the bankrupt owed the bank. 
The setoff was made the same day that the deposit was 
made, and, at the time of the setoff the bank was aware of 
depositor's insolvency. In holding that the bank had a right 
of setoff, the Court said: 
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"The depositor, the Whitenight's, Inc. was indebt-
ed to the bank, and the bank had the right to set off 
its debt to the depositor, arising by the deposit, against 
the debt the depositor owed it, and it makes no differ-
ence whether the deposit was one day old or one year 
old, or whether checks to the order of other creditors 
had been honored by the bank or not. The bank did 
only what it had a right to do, and should do." (em-
phasis added) 
* * * * * 
"The right of setoff is given by the Bankruptcy 
Act itself, and the test in cases where the right of set-
off by a bank is questioned is always whether, after 
insolvency, the money was deposited for the purpose of 
enabling the bank to secure a preference. If not, the 
setoff should be made. New York County National 
Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 48 L. Ed. 
380. The statement of claim in this case contains no 
averment to the effect that the deposits were made for 
the purpose of enabling the bank to secure a pref er-
ence. Therefore, the setoff was properly and legally 
made, and did not constitute a preference which may 
be recovered by the trustee." 
"In Studley, Trustee, v. Boylston National Bank, 
229 U.S. 523, page 527, 33 S. Ct. 806, 808, 51 L. Ed. 
1313, Mr. Justice Lamar said, in delivering the opin-
ion of the court : 
" 'The money so deposited was the proceeds of the 
sale of tickets to a large party of round-the-world 
tourists, and was put in bank, not for the purpose of 
pref erring it, but in the expectation of being used for 
carrying on the business in the future as in the past. 
Indeed, the payments were made with the statement 
that the company would expect the Bank to discount 
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other notes. We find nothing in the record to indicate 
that the deposits were made for the purpose of enab-
ling the bank to secure a preference by the exercise of 
the right of set-off. The case, therefore, comes directly 
within the decision in New York County Nat. Bank v. 
Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 48 L. Ed. 380, 
where $3,884 deposited by an insolvent customer, in 
good faith, four days before the filing of the petition 
against him, was allowed to the bank by way of set-off 
on notes of the bankrupt held by it.'" McGuigan at 762 
The case on appeal falls within the language of the 
McGuigan case. The setoffs were made the same day as 
the deposit and there is no proof that the deposits were 
made with the purpose of enabling the bank to secure a 
preference. 
In the case of In re Empire Flooring Co. 43 F. 2d. 748 
(D.C.W.D. Pa. 1930), the Court said that: 
"Therefore, unless the trustee is in a position to 
show that the bank balance at the time of the adjudica-
tion in bankruptcy had been created with a special 
purpose of giving a preference to the bank, the bank 
would legally be entitled to have a set-off." Empire 
Flooring at 7 49. 
In the case of In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 212 F. 
397 (2nd Cir. 1914), the Court held that the right of a bank 
to apply a deposit on a debt due it within four months be-
fore the filing of a petition in bankruptcy cannot be denied 
upon a mere suspicion or bare inference that it had reason-
able cause to believe that a preference would be effected. 
"And the court declared in its opinion that there 
was no evidence, unless by inference, that bankruptcy 
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was contemplated, or that any preference was intended 
by the company, prior to January 1, 1912. We think 
that as to the set-offs thus allowed, the court below 
was right in sustaining them, as it was not made to 
satisfactorily appear that the bank had reasonable 
cause to believe, at the time they were made, that a 
preference would be thereby effected. The right of 
the bank to make the set-offs made prior to January 
1, 1912, cannot be denied upon a mere suspicion or a 
bare inference. If courts were to proceed so to admin-
ister the law, banks could not safely do business with 
insolvents. The intention of the act that insolvency 
should not deprive one of his right to remain in busi-
ness would be destroyed in large part, and bankruptcy 
in many cases would be precipitated, if the courts 
should, upon slight inferences, deny the right of set-
off." Wright-Dana Hardware at 402. (emphasis added) 
POINT III. 
THE BANK'S RIGHT OF SETOFF APPLIES TO 
OVERDRAFTS AS WELL AS TO OVERDUE NOTES. 
The majority of cases which deal with a bank's right 
of setoff under Section 68 (a) involve a setoff by the bank 
against notes the bank is holding. However, the principles 
of setoff also apply where the depositor has an overdraft 
with the bank. 
The case of Tomlinson v. Bank of Lexington, 145 F. 824 
(4th Cir. 1906), is factually similar to the case on appeal. 
In that case a partnership owed the bank about $13,000.00 
in notes, and for about two years preceding bankruptcy, 
the company had carried an overdraft with the bank to 
pay for the day-to-day expenses of running the business. 
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The bank and the company had a distinct understanding 
and agreement that the next succeeding deposits would dis-
charge the overdraft. The bank allowed the overdrafts "be-
cause of the promise of the company to deposit the proceeds 
of certain good accounts held by the company to the pay-
ment of the overdraft." 
The Court held that the bank did not receive a voidable 
preference by permitting the customer to overdraw its 
checking account on the express agreement that the cus-
tomer would assign good accounts for collection to pay the 
overdrafts. The Court stated: 
The transfer, too, was made as found by the referee, 
not only in the regular and due course of business, but 
on a distinct understanding and agreement to that ef-
fect. It should be borne in mind none of these over-
drafts or the proceeds of assigned accounts were cred-
ited on the bank debt of $13,100, evidenced by notes 
endorsed by Montcastle and Ward, officers of the bank, 
but were credited on the overdrafts permitted under 
the express agreement; "a fair exchange of values,'' 
as expressed in Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, 21 L. Ed. 
933, "which may be made at any time even if one of 
the parties is insolvent." Tomlinson at 828. 
It is to be noted in connection with the rule of the Bank 
of Lexington case that Wheat Bros. began incurring over-
drafts in 1964. In September of 1965 the Bank contacted 
the Company and was assured that receivables would soon 
be forthcoming from Jacobsen Construction and others. 
Thereupon the Bank contacted those from whom the Com-
pany claimed money was owed and merely confirmed that 
fact. 
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In the case of Steere v. Stockyards Nat. Bank, 266 s. 
W. 531 (Tex. 1924), the bankrupt had maintained an ae-
count with the bank for more than three years prior to 
bankruptcy. The bankrupt was often allowed to draw 
checks which caused overdrafts which were subsequently 
paid by deposits. At one point within four months of bank-
ruptcy the bankrupt had an overdraft of over $45,000. At 
that point the bank president called the bankrupt to in-
quire for information. The bank was told that a large de-
posit would soon be made, and, in fact, a few days later, 
a deposit in excess of the overdraft was made. Thereafter, 
the bankrupt's checks were honored until the bank learned 
of the insolvency. The Court held that the bank had a right 
to apply the deposits to the overdraft and that such appli-
cation did not amount to an undue preference. The Court 
in so ruling said : 
The same case is authority for the conclusion that the 
mere fact that an overdraft, or overdrafts, from time 
to time may occur in a depositor's account, does not 
amount to notice either of his insolvency or of the trust 
character of the fund deposited. Steere at 535. 
"The general rule is well settled that when a depositor 
is indebted to a bank, the bank may apply his deposits, 
or such portion thereof as may be necessary, to the 
payment of his indebtedness; unless there be an agree-
ment to the contrary, or unless the deposit be specially 
applicable to some other particular purpose, or unless 
the bank has notice that the funds do not belong to 
the customer. This right to apply the deposit to the 
customer's indebtedness is called the banker's lien, or 
right of setof f, and does not depend upon the custom-
er's assent. Instances of its application are most fre-
quently found in the case of antecedent debts. We have 
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found no case holding that the consent of the customer 
was a prerequisite of the bank's right to assert its 
lien." Steere at 536. 
In the case of American Bank of Alaska v. Johnson, 
245 F. 312 (9th Cir. 1917), the bankrupt would alternately 
have an overdraft and then clear it with a deposit. At the 
time of the transaction in question, the bankrupt owed the 
bank $13,000 on notes and $4,096.14 on an overdraft. The 
bankrupt then made a deposit of $3,750.14 in gold dust 
which the bank setoff against the overdraft. The Court 
allowed the setoff even though the bank had often asked 
the bankrupt about the overdraft. The Court said: 
The transaction established the relationship of debtor 
and creditor. There having been a general deposit in 
course of business when the credit was made, the bank 
had a right to set off the notes and to dismiss the over-
draft. Cumberland Glass Co. v. De Witt, 237 U. S. 
447, 35 Sup. Ct. 636, 59 L. Ed. 1042; In re Wright-
Dana Hardware Co., 212 Fed. 397, 129 C. C. A. 73. 
* * * * * 
There is no showing of fraud in the transaction. The 
bank had paid checks for the half month preceding 
July 31st, when the firm was owing the bank a consid-
erable amount, and, although the officers were solici-
tous about the account, they had no reasonable ground 
to believe that the condition of the firm was desperate, 
or that it would not be able to go on with its mining. 
Johnson at 315. 
The appellant readily admits that it was desirous of 
having Wheat Bros.' overdrafts cleared, as were the banks 
in the cases cited above, and that it did contact some of 
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Wheat Bros.' debtors to ascertain if funds would be forth-
coming, but it is strongly contended that such concern and 
caution does not take the deposits out of the ordinary course 
of business. 
Section 68 (a) makes no distinction between notes or 
overdrafts as far as its right of setoff is concerned. 
POINT IV 
A. THE BANK DID NOT KNOW OR HA VE REASON-
ABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT WHEAT BROS. WAS 
INSOLVENT AT THE TIME THE DEPOSITS WERE 
MADE. 
The lower court found that, "at the time of each of 
the transfers above referred to, the defendant had reason-
able cause to believe that Wheat Bros. was insolvent," and 
also that, "at the time of each of said transfers, the defen-
dant knew that Wheat Bros. was insolvent." It is appellant's 
contention that the findings of the lower court are not 
supported by the facts of this case. The appellant certainly 
did not know that Wheat Bros. was insolvent nor did they 
have reasonable cause to believe such. 
Under Section 1(18) of the Bankruptcy Act, a person 
is insolvent if the " ... aggregate of his property ... shall 
not in a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his 
debts." Against this definition we measure the knowledge 
of the Bank. 
It is well to keep in mind that Wheat Bros. had been 
a good customer of the Bank since 1950. On February 24, 
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1964, Wheat Bros. submitted a financial statement to the 
Bank which showed total assets of $59,845.00 and total 
liabilities of only $2,050.00. On June 1, 1965, Wheat Bros. 
submitted another financial statement to the Bank which 
showed assets of $95,342.00 and liabilities of $16,000.00 
(Exhibit D-15). While it is true that Wheat Bros. had a 
continual overdraft with the Bank from the period of 
August 9, 1965 to September 22, 1965, the Bank had enough 
confidence in Wheat Bros. that none of their checks were 
returned with the exception of two checks written to Gran-
ite National Bank, one being for the amount of $5,000.00, 
the other for interest on that sum, which were returned 
on September 20, 1965. The checks were returned only be-
cause of the amount of money involved and the fact that 
such debt had not been listed on the financial statement of 
June 1, 1965 (R. 79). On September 9, 1965, Wheat Bros. 
made a deposit of $3,900.00, against which they drafted 
checks. Then, on September 21, 1965, the Company made 
a deposit of $21,320.00, the bulk of which was the Jacobsen 
Construction Company check for $18,150.00. Therefore, at 
the time of the September 21st deposit, the Company had 
a fairly substantial overdraft and an overdue note for 
$5,000.00. However, it must be kept in mind that the Bank 
had checked with Jacobsen Construction Company and 
knew that the funds would be forthcoming from Jacobsen 
(R. 108). The Bank also relied on the fact that Wheat 
Bros. was a long standing customer and upon the financial 
statements which the Company had submitted to the Bank 
over a period of time. 
After the deposit of September 22nd was set off against 
the overdraft, Wheat Bros. had a credit balance and drafted 
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checks against that balance. On September 24th and again 
on September 29th, Wheat Bros. made fairly substantial 
deposits to the Bank, against which they also drafted checks. 
Then, on October 4th Wheat Bros. made a deposit of 
$7,384.00, against which the Bank set off the amount of 
$5,131.25 for a note that was then overdue to the Bank. 
On October 8th, the Company made a deposit of $3,696.38, 
against which the Bank made no setoff. On October 18th 
' the Company made a deposit of $4,153.48, against which 
a setoff was made of $4,050.00 against a note which was 
also overdue at that time. 
The few days surrounding that last transaction are 
vital. The testimony of Mr. Joe Wheat was to the effect 
that when his brother, John, who had been keeping the 
books ended up in the hospital, he began searching around 
to determine the financial condition of the partnership. Of 
critical importance is the fact that one of the partners 
himself did not know of the detailed financial condition 
until he had thoroughly searched the records (R. 53, 56, 
67). He made a deposit in the Bank on October 18th which 
he intended to utilize for payment of payroll checks, but 
as was mentioned above, the Bank exercised its right of 
setoff because no arrangement had been made for the use 
of the money for special purposes and the Bank was not 
advised in advance of the impending deposit (R. 54). When 
Joe Wheat first visited the Bank during that week, the 
Bank advised him of the information it had received from 
John Wheat regarding the financial condition of the Com-
pany. Two days later and after receipt and application of 
the October 18th deposit, Joe brought to the Bank the books 
and records of the Company which evidenced some financial 
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problems. It was on October 20th, two days after the l,ast 
setoff, that the Bank first learned of the sad financial con-
dition of Wheat Bros. (R. 62, 64). Up until that time, it 
had been relying in good faith and with good cause on the 
financial statements that Wheat Bros. had submitted to the 
Bank. The discovery of serious financial trouble was as 
much a surprise to the Bank as it was to Joe Wheat. The 
fact that the bankers discussed at that time various alterna-
tive insolvency proceedings does not in the least suggest 
that the bankers had knowledge of insolvency at an earlier 
time. 
Even during the months prior to September 21st, the 
inquiries of the Bank resulted in favorable information re-
garding Wheat Bros.' financial condition. On September 2, 
1965, the Bank received information from John Wheat re-
garding the accounts receivable from three contractors and 
confirmed receivables with all of them (Exhibit D-18, R. 
102). The Dun & Bradstreet report confirmed the fact that 
the business continued to operate on a profitable basis with 
work capital restricted because of difficulty in collection 
of accounts receivable (Exhibit D-17). The Bank knew of 
that precise problem and for that reason extended credit 
from time to time because of the expectation of subsequent 
collection of the accounts receivable. The end result of all 
available financial information would be that Wh·eat Bros. 
had large accounts receivables which exceeded the obliga-
tions due and the Bank could not, even if under a duty to 
do so, have discovered the full extent of the accounts pay-
able which were subsequently listed in the bankruptcy peti-
tions. The books of account themselves did not reflect the 
accounts payable (Exhibits P-7, P-8; R. 50, 51, 64). 
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The appellant vigorously denies that it knew that 
Wheat Bros. was insolvent at the time of any one of the 
three deposits in question. It likewise denies that it had 
reasonable cause to suspect that Wheat Bros. was insolvent. 
At the very most, some of these circumstances surrounding 
the deposits and some of the activities of the Company may 
have caused the Bank to become somewhat dubious con-
cerning the ability of the Company to meet its current 
debts, but no facts were evident which would suggest in-
solvency. However, it is widely held that mere suspicion 
of insolvency is not the same as knowing of insolvency or 
having reasonable cause to believe that someone is insolvent. 
Am. Jur. states the general rule: 
Reasonable cause to believe is not the equivalent of 
actual knowledge or actual belief. It is sufficient to 
satisfy this element that the creditor have such knowl-
edge or be put upon notice of such facts and circum-
stances as would incite a person of reasonable prudence 
under similar circumstances to make inquiry as to the 
financial condition of the debtor. Facts which are 
sufficient to put such a man upon inquiry charge the 
creditor with all the knowledge he could have acquired 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Mere cause to 
suspect the debtor's insolvency, however, is not the 
equivalent of reasonable cause to believe him to be in-
solvent. A mere suspicion in the creditor's mind is in-
sufficient to put him upon inquiry concerning the fi-
nancial condition of the debtor or charge him with 
notice that the debtor is insolvent. 9 Am. Jur.2d Bank-
ruptcy Sec. 1083 (1963). 
The case of McDonald v. Lawson, 356 P. 2d 1041 (Wyo. 
1960), states the general rule that mere suspicion is not 
sufficient to charge the creditor with knowledge of in-
solvency. That Court said: 
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All the cases agree that it is not enough that a creditor 
have some cause to suspect insolvency but he must 
have knowledge of facts to induce him to believe that 
his debtor is insolvent. A case often cited is Grant v. 
National Bank, 97 U.S. 80, 81, 24 L. Ed. 791, where 
the Supreme Court of the United States stated: 
". . . It is not enough that a creditor has some cause 
to suspect the insolvency of his debtor; but he must 
have such a knowledge of facts as to induce a reason-
able belief of his debtor's insolvency, in order to in-
validate a security taken for his debt. To make mere 
suspicion a ground of nullity in such a case would 
render the business transaction of the community al-
together too insecure. It was never the intention of 
the framers of the act to establish any such rule. A 
man may have many grounds of suspicion that his 
debtor is in failing circumstances, and yet have no 
cause for a well-grounded belief of the fact. He may 
be unwilling to trust him further; he may feel anxious 
about his claim, and have a strong desire to secure it, 
-and yet such belief as the act requires may be want-
ing. Obtaining additional security, or receiving pay-
ment of a debt, under such circumstances is not 
prohibited by the law. Receiving payment is put in the 
same category, in the section referred to, as receiving 
security. Hundreds of men constantly continue to 
make payments up to the very eve of their failure, 
which it would be very unjust and disastrous to set 
aside. And yet this could be done in a large proportion 
of cases if mere grounds of suspicion of their solvency 
were sufficient for the purpose." 
In Gray v. Little, 97 Cal. App. 442, 275 P. 870, 871, 
872, the court succinctly stated some of the principles 
applicable as follows: 
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"The fact alone that a creditor knows his debtor to 
be financially embarrassed and is pressing for a pay-
ment of his claim is not sufficient to charge him with 
having reasonable cause to believe his debtor to be in-
solvent. Sharpe v. Allender (C.C.A.) 170 F. 589; Page 
v. Moore, (D.C.), 179 F. 988. Mere suspicion that the 
debtor may be insolvent is not sufficient to render pay-
ments received by a creditor voidable as preference, 
but he must have such knowledge of facts as to induce 
a reasonable belief of insolvency. Bassett v. Evans ( C. 
C.A.) 253 F. 532; City National Bank of Columbus v. 
Slocum (C.C.A.) 272 F. 11; Homan v. Hirsch, 106 Or. 
98, 211 P. 795. It is not enough that a creditor has 
cause to suspect the insolvency of the debtor, but he 
must have such a knowledge of facts as to induce a 
reasonable belief of his debtor's insolvency, in order 
to invalidate a security taken for his debt. Grant v. 
National Bank, 97 U.S. 80, 81, 24 L. Ed. 971; In re 
Campion et al. (D.C.) 256 F. 902. In the case last cited 
the court said that the burden is on the trustee in 
bankruptcy to show that the creditor to whom the 
transfer was made shortly before bankruptcy had 
reason to believe that a preference would result. The 
trustee has failed to sustain this burden in this 
case .... " 
See further In re Solof, 9 Cir., 2 F. 2d 130; In re Sal-
mon, 2 Cir., 249 F. 300; Cate v. Certainteed Products 
Corporation, 23 Cal. 2d 444, 144 P. 2d 335." McDonald 
at 1044. 
At most, appellant had mere suspicion of Wheat Bros.' 
inability to pay its debts as they matured. Nothing in the 
record shows that the Bank had reason to doubt the excess 
of Wheat Bros. assets over its liabilities as clearly expressed 
in the financial information available to the Bank. 
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POINT IV. 
B. EVEN IF THE BANK KNEW OR HAD REASON 
TO KNOW OF WHEAT BROS.' INSOLVENCY, SUCH 
FACT IS IRRELEVANT IN THIS CASE. 
Notwithstanding the argument made in Point IV A, 
supra, and notwithstanding that appellant strongly denies 
that it had reason to suspect that Wheat Bros. was insol-
vent, it is submitted that such knowledge or suspicion of in-
solvency would make no difference in the outcome of this 
case. 
The general rule is : 
"The fact alone that the bank, at the time of the making 
of the deposit, knows that the depositor is insolvent 
or in financial difficulties will not affect its right of 
setoff. The mere fact that at the time a bank applies 
a depositor's balance on his indebtedness to it, the 
bank is charged with knowledge that the depositor is 
insolvent, does not make the application a preferential 
payment. If the deposit is made more than 4 months 
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by the 
depositor, the mere exercise by the bank of the right 
of setoff, though within this period, or even after the 
institution of bankruptcy proceedings, does not con-
stitute a preferential transfer. It seems, generally 
speaking, to be immaterial that the debt owing by the 
depositor to the bank arose from an overdraft on the 
part of the depositor. 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy Sec. 
525 (1963) ." 
The Supreme Court case of Massey, supra, supports 
this rule. Also, the Court is reminded of the above quoted 
statement found in 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) par. 
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60.15 which said in part, " ... were not preferential trans-
fers, even if made while the debtor was insolvent and the 
bank had knowledge or notice of the depositor's insolvency." 
In the case of In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 212 
F. 397 (2nd Cir., 1914), the Court discusses a bank's right 
of setoff under Section 68 (a) : 
"Our attention is called to the fact that the referee 
found that the Wright-Dana Company was insolvent 
on September 15, 1911 (four months before bankrupt-
cy), and continued to be insolvent to the date of its 
adjudication in bankruptcy on February 5, 1912, and 
that during the whole of that time the fact of its in-
solvency was known to the bank. All this may be true 
and yet not deprive the bank of its right to set-off. A 
bank may do business in the usual manner with one it 
knows to be insolvent. The mere fact of insolvency, or 
mere knowledge of the insolvency of the depositor, is 
not alone sufficient to take away the bank's right of 
setoff. Wright-Dana Hardware at 401. 
In the case of In re Cummins Const. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 
409 (D.C. Md., 1947), the Court said: 
If a bank, in the ordinary course of business, receives 
deposits from a depositor before and during four 
months next preceding such depositor's adjudication 
in bankruptcy, and if during such four month period, 
with notice that such depositor is in financial difficul-
ties, the bank applies his deposits against his indebted-
ness to the bank, has the bank thereby received a 
voidable preference? The law is very clear that this 
question must be answered in the negative. The Su-
preme Court so decided as early as 1904, in New York 
County Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 
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48 L. Ed. 380, and again in Studley v. Boylston Bank, 
229 U.S. 523, 33 S. Ct. 806, 57 L. Ed. 1313. See also 
United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U. S. 
387, 45 S. Ct. 338, 69 L. Ed. 672 and Citizens National 
Bank of Gastonia, N. C. v. Lineberger, a decision of 
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 45 F. 
2d 522. Cummins Const. at 413-14." 
POINT V. 
THE TRUSTEE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
PROVING A VOIDABLE PREFERENCE BY A PRE-
PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND RESPOND-
ENT HAS NOT MET THAT BURDEN. 
In the case of Farmer's Bank v. Julian, 383 F. 2d 314 
(8th Cir., 1967), which involved a bank's right of setoff, 
the Court said that: 
The Trustee has the burden of proof of proving a 
voidable preference by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. City Nat. Bank v. Slocum, 272 F. 11 (6 Cir. 
1921) cert. denied 257 U. S. 637, 42 S. Ct. 49, 66 L. 
Ed. 409; Moran Bros., Inc. v. Yinger, 323 F. 2d 699 
(10 Cir. 1963). Julian at 324. 
The case of Moran Bros., Inc. v. Yinger, 323 F. 2d 699 
(10th Cir., 1963), deals with reasonable cause to know of 
insolvency under Section 60. The Court held that the trustee 
has the burden of proof in establishing a preference and 
that there is a presumption of good faith on the part of a 
creditor who receives a payment of his debt. 
And, finally, as a corollary to the rule imposing the 
burden of proof upon the trustee, there is a presump-
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tion of good faith on the part of a creditor who re-
ceives a payment of his debt which must be overcome 
by evidence of reasonable cause to believe that the 
debtor is insolvent. Canright v. General Finance Cor-
poration, & Cir., 123 F. 2d 98; Republic National 
Bank of Dallas v. Vial, 5 Cir., 232 F. 2d 785. Yinger 
at 702. 
In the case of City Nat. Bank v. Slocum, 272 F. n 
(6th Cir. 1921), the Court held that the trustee had the ' 
burden of proof in establishing that a transfer of a mort-
gage was a preferential transfer. 
It is submitted to the court that the trustee in the case 
on appeal has not met the burden of proof to establish a 
preferential transfer. There is no substantial evidence in 
the record to show that either the appellant had knowledge 
of insolvency or that any of the deposits in question were 
made other than in the regular course of business. That 
being the case, the bank was completely within its right 
in setting off the deposits against the debts owed to the 
Bank. Such right of setoff is explicitly allowed under Sec-
tion 68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Therefore, the appellant requests that this court re-
verse the lower court and allow appellant to retain the set-
offs that it made. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
reverse the judgment rendered against appellant for the 
following reasons: 
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(a) The receipt of deposits of Wheat Bros. and 
the right of setoff exercised by appellant were not 
preferential transfers ; 
(b) The Bank, through its officers, had no 
knowledge and no reasonable cause to believe, that 
Wheat Bros. was insolvent at the time the Bank exer-
cised its right of setoff; 
( c) The setoff between mutual obligors provided 
by Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act places the trans-
actions between appellant and Wheat Bros. directly in 
harmony with existing law, and not subject to avoid-
ance by the trustee; and 
(d) Respondent failed to meet its burden of 
proof in the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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